MORAL HAZARD IN TEAMS

被引：2532
|
作者：
HOLMSTROM, B
机构：
来源：
BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1982年 / 13卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/3003457
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：324 / 340
页数：17
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