The article strengthens and provides a dynamic extension of the theory on collective rent seeking and private provision of a public good. Each individual agent within each group chooses in continuous or discrete time a continuous or discrete effort level. The combined effort within each group provides within-group public goods which are used as an input in the between-group n-group competition for an external prize. Intergroup mobility and intergroup warfare are allowed for. Each group and each individual agent within each group get a fraction of the prize based on a linear combination of equity and relative effort. A model/algorithm is developed generating analytical results and simulations illustrating how the interaction within and between groups proceeds through time.
机构:
Univ Iowa, Dept Psychol & Quantitat Fdn, 240 South Madison St,361 Lindquist Ctr South, Iowa City, IA 52242 USAUniv Iowa, Dept Psychol & Quantitat Fdn, 240 South Madison St,361 Lindquist Ctr South, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
Rigg, Thomas
Kivlighan, D. Martin, III
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机构:
Univ Iowa, Dept Psychol & Quantitat Fdn, 240 South Madison St,361 Lindquist Ctr South, Iowa City, IA 52242 USAUniv Iowa, Dept Psychol & Quantitat Fdn, 240 South Madison St,361 Lindquist Ctr South, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA