The philosophical thought of Dai Zhen and Chinese tradition

This article examines the philosophical ideas of Dai Zhen (1724–1777), a prominent classical scholar and thinker in the Confucian tradition. The writer argues (i) that what triggered Dai Zhen’s criticism of Neo-Confucianism, especially Zhu Xi’s School of Principle, was his perception that its ideas were used to oppress people; (ii) that he derived this perceived oppressive function from the philosophical error of taking li, principle, as a subjective entity, which people could define at will, rather than as an objective feature of reality; and (iii) that he considered this error as a deviation from the early Confucian thought of Confucius, Mencius and others caused by Buddhist and Daoist influence. Convinced that the Confucian Classics contained the fundamental truths about human beings and our place in the universe, the idea that these classics contained serious errors was unthinkable for Dai Zhen. In this sense he still operated within the confines of a totalitarian intellectual order. Yet, he was as concerned with the abuse of power in the name of Confucianism as with philological errors. While he would not have questioned the authority of the classics, it is striking how he insisted that their interpretation must be determined by intellectual criteria rather than dynastic power. In this respect Dai Zhen anticipated an essential feature of modern thought, and so it is not surprising that he caught the attention of seminal early modern thinkers such as Zhang Taiyan, Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, Liu Shipei and, especially, Hu Shi.