Unwilling or willing but unable: can horses interpret human actions as goal directed?

被引:0
|
作者
Miléna Trösch
Emma Bertin
Ludovic Calandreau
Raymond Nowak
Léa Lansade
机构
[1] INRAE,
[2] PRC,undefined
[3] CNRS,undefined
[4] IFCE,undefined
[5] Université de Tours,undefined
来源
Animal Cognition | 2020年 / 23卷
关键词
Social cognition; Intentions; Horse–human relationship;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Social animals can gain important benefits by inferring the goals behind the behavior of others. However, this ability has only been investigated in a handful of species outside of primates. In this study, we tested for the first time whether domestic horses can interpret human actions as goal directed. We used the classical “unwilling versus unable” paradigm: an experimenter performed three similar actions that have the same outcome, but the goal of the experimenter differed. In the unwilling condition, the experimenter had no intention to give a piece of food to a horse and moved it out of reach when the horse tried to eat it. In the two unable conditions, the experimenter had the intention to give the food to the horse but was unable to do so, either because there was a physical barrier between them or because of the experimenter’s clumsiness. The horses (n = 21) reacted differently in the three conditions: they showed more interest in the unable conditions, especially in the unable clumsy condition, than in the unwilling condition. These results are similar to results found in primates with the same paradigm and suggest that horses might have taken the experimenter’s goal, or even intentions, into account to adapt their behavior. Hence, our study offers more insights into horse interspecific social cognition towards humans.
引用
收藏
页码:1035 / 1040
页数:5
相关论文
共 15 条
  • [1] Unwilling or willing but unable: can horses interpret human actions as goal directed?
    Trosch, Milena
    Bertin, Emma
    Calandreau, Ludovic
    Nowak, Raymond
    Lansade, Lea
    ANIMAL COGNITION, 2020, 23 (05) : 1035 - 1040
  • [2] 'Unwilling' versus 'unable': Tonkean macaques' understanding of human goal-directed actions
    Canteloup, Charlotte
    Meunier, Helene
    PEERJ, 2017, 5
  • [3] 'Unwilling' versus 'unable': Tonkean macaques' understanding of human goal-directed actions (vol 5, e3227/correction-1, 2019)
    Canteloup, Charlotte
    Meunier, Helene
    PEERJ, 2019, 7
  • [4] 'Unwilling' versus 'unable' Do grey parrots understand human intentional actions?
    Peron, Franck
    Rat-Fischer, Lauriane
    Nagle, Laurent
    Bovet, Dalila
    INTERACTION STUDIES, 2010, 11 (03) : 428 - 441
  • [5] INFANT RHESUS MACAQUES (MACACA MULATTA) INTERPRET REACH-GRASP ACTIONS AS GOAL-DIRECTED
    Paukner, A.
    Slonecker, E. M.
    AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PRIMATOLOGY, 2018, 80
  • [6] Do Domestic Dogs Understand Human Actions as Goal-Directed?
    Marshall-Pescini, Sarah
    Ceretta, Maria
    Prato-Previde, Emanuela
    PLOS ONE, 2014, 9 (09):
  • [7] The Language of Actions: Recovering the Syntax and Semantics of Goal-Directed Human Activities
    Kuehne, Hilde
    Arslan, Ali
    Serre, Thomas
    2014 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION AND PATTERN RECOGNITION (CVPR), 2014, : 780 - 787
  • [8] The posterior superior temporal sulcus is sensitive to the outcome of human and non-human goal-directed actions
    Shultz, Sarah
    Lee, Su Mei
    Pelphrey, Kevin
    McCarthy, Gregory
    SOCIAL COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 2011, 6 (05) : 602 - 611
  • [9] Understanding goal-directed human actions and physical causality: The role of mother-infant interaction
    Hohenberger, Annette
    Elsabbagh, Mayada
    Serres, Josette
    de Schoenen, Scania
    Karmiloff-Smith, Annette
    Aschersleben, Gisa
    INFANT BEHAVIOR & DEVELOPMENT, 2012, 35 (04): : 898 - 911
  • [10] You Can't Always Get What You Want: Infants Understand Failed Goal-Directed Actions
    Brandone, Amanda C.
    Wellman, Henry M.
    PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 2009, 20 (01) : 85 - 91