Aptness predicts preference for metaphors or similes, as well as recall bias

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作者
Dan L. Chiappe
John M. Kennedy
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[1] University of British Columbia,
[2] University of Toronto,undefined
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Recall Task; False Recall; Comparison Theory; Preference Judgment; Consensus Level;
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摘要
Why might we sometimes prefer a metaphor such as “genes are blueprints” to a simile such as “genes are like blueprints”? One possibility is that metaphors are preferred when the comparison between a tenor (e.g., genes) and a vehicle (e.g., blueprints) seems especially apt. That is, metaphors might be used when the comparison captures many salient features of the tenor in question. The present experiments examined the relation between the aptness of comparisons and people’s preferences for expressing those comparisons as metaphors or as similes. In Experiment 1, it was found that there is consensus on how to express particular comparisons. In Experiment 2, it was found that this preference can be predicted from the aptness of a comparison. It was also found that aptness can predict errors in the recall of comparisons. These findings have implications for theories of metaphor.
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页码:668 / 676
页数:8
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