When Do State-Owned Firms Crowd Out Private Investment?

被引：4
|
作者：
Buehler S. [1 ]
Wey S. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Institute of Economics, University of St. Gallen, 9000 St. Gallen
[2] Department of Business Administration, University of Zurich, 8032 Zurich
来源：
Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade | 2014年 / 14卷 / 3期
关键词：
Crowding out; Political agenda; Public investment;
D O I：
10.1007/s10842-013-0164-y
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper examines the conditions under which a state-owned firm with a political agenda strategically crowds out investment by a private firm. Employing reduced-form analysis, we show that strategic crowding out occurs if (i) the private firm regards investments as strategic substitutes, and (ii) private investment is undesirable from the state-owned firm's perspective. We discuss how our analysis applies to real-world markets and argue that it provides an explanation for the ambivalent evidence on the effect of public on private investment: State ownership is neither necessary nor sufficient for crowding out to occur. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
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页码：319 / 330
页数：11
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