Handoff calls’ joining behavior and incentive mechanism in wireless cellular networks with retrial orbit

In wireless cellular networks, handoff is a key element in providing quality of service and supporting mobility for users. There is an interaction between wireless cellular networks and handoff calls which strategically act to achieve their own objectives. In order to reasonably control the access of handoff calls and achieve the optimization of social network resources, we present a game-theoretic queueing model to investigate the strategic behavior of handoff calls in wireless cellular networks. The noncooperative joining behavior of handoff calls that maximizes their expected net benefit selfishly is considered. Moreover, the socially optimal joining behavior of handoff calls that maximizes their social total welfare is analyzed. The equilibrium and socially optimal strategies of handoff calls are obtained. Counter-intuitively, we find that the socially optimal joining probability is larger than the equilibrium joining probability. In order to eliminate the difference of joining probabilities, an appropriate incentive-payment is proposed to attract handoff calls to join the system actively. In doing so, it is feasible to induce individuals to behave in a socially best way.