Liquidity risks on power exchanges: a generalized Nash equilibrium model

被引:0
|
作者
Gauthier de Maere d’Aertrycke
Yves Smeers
机构
[1] Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM),Department of Mathematical Engineering, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics
[2] Euro-Mediterranean Center on Climate Change (CMCC),undefined
[3] GDF SUEZ,undefined
[4] Center of Expertise in Economic Modelling and Studies,undefined
[5] Université Catholique de Louvain,undefined
来源
Mathematical Programming | 2013年 / 140卷
关键词
90C33 Complementarity problems; 91B28 Finance, portfolios, investment; 91B26 Market models (auctions, bargaining, bidding, selling; etc.);
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学科分类号
摘要
The extreme volatility of electricity prices makes their financial derivatives important instruments for asset managers. Even if the volume of derivative contracts traded on Power Exchanges has been growing since the inception of the restructuring of the sector, electricity remains considerably less liquid than other commodity markets. This paper assesses the effect of limited liquidity in power exchanges using an equilibrium model where agents cannot hedge up to their desired level. Mathematically, the problem is formulated as a two stage stochastic Generalized Nash Equilibrium with possibly multiple equilibria. Computing a large panel of solutions, we show how the risk premium and players profits are affected by illiquidity. We also show that the illiquidity in the FTR market affects the trades in the electricity futures market.
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页码:381 / 414
页数:33
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