Many disciplines have recently emerged, which are all characterized by the prefix "neuro" added to the name of a traditional discipline from the fields of social sciences or humanities. Among them, there is "neuro-economics." These disciplines are all based on the assumption of modularity. However, modularity is not the only possible way to conceive of the relations between mental functions and the brain. Furthermore, the assumption of modularity becomes useful only on condition that there are ways for determining what brain areas are active at a given moment, while a human being is performing an experimental task. In spite of the popularity neuro-imagining techniques enjoy that is not (yet?) the case. Even more problematic is the fact that, in order to make use of neuro-imagines, one must know what mental functions are required to perform the experimental task and what is the time course of those functions. For very few tasks, if any, we have the type of knowledge that would be necessary. Finally, even assuming that all conditions are met, what we would have achieved is simply to map mental functions into brain areas. However, localizing does not mean explaining and/or understanding. Even if it were possible precisely to map-specific mental functions into well-localized brain areas, which presently is not, the explanatory value of brain localization is doubtful. In order to explain why and how a given mental function occurs, knowing where in the brain it takes place is of little help. A true explanation requires being precise and explicit about the mechanisms that cause that mental function. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.
