Monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions on convex games

被引:0
|
作者
Toru Hokari
机构
[1] Institute of Economic Research,
[2] Kyoto University,undefined
[3] Yoshida-Honmachi,undefined
[4] Sakyo-ku,undefined
[5] Kyoto 606-8501,undefined
[6] Japan (e-mail: hokari@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp),undefined
来源
Social Choice and Welfare | 2002年 / 19卷
关键词
Desirable Property; Convex Game;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
It is well known that on the domain of convex games, the Dutta-Ray solution satisfies many desirable properties such as population-monotonicity, max consistency, converse max consistency, and conditional self-consistency. In this paper, we define a family of possibly non-symmetric and non-homogeneous generalizations of the Dutta-Ray solution, which we refer to as “monotone-path Dutta-Ray solutions.” We show that above four properties are preserved by our generalizations.
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页码:825 / 844
页数:19
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