Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

被引:2
|
作者
Rose D.C. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Missouri-St. Louis, St. Louis
关键词
Cooperation; Firm governance; Firm objectives; Incentive alignment; Maximization; Property rights; Residual claimancy; Residual control; Theory of the firm;
D O I
10.1023/A:1010039609636
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.
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页码:25 / 39
页数:14
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