On the Arrow and Wilson impossibility theorems

被引：0
|
作者：
Donald E. Campbell
Jerry S. Kelly
机构：
[1] Department of Economics and The Program in Public Policy,
[2] The College of William and Mary,undefined
[3] Williamsburg,undefined
[4] VA 23187-8795,undefined
[5] USA (e-mail: decamp@wm.edu),undefined
[6] Department of Economics,undefined
[7] Syracuse University,undefined
[8] Syracuse,undefined
[9] NY 13244-1090,undefined
[10] USA (e-mail: jskelly@syr.edu),undefined
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2003年 / 20卷
关键词：
Social Welfare; Social Welfare Function; Logical Relation; Impossibility Theorem; Pareto Criterion;
D O I：
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中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
A social welfare function is Arrovian if it is transitive-valued and satisfies IIA. We examine the logical relation between the statements (A) If f is Arrovian with domain 𝒫 then it is dictatorial if it satisfies the Pareto criterion and (W) If f is Arrovian with domain 𝒫 then it is dictatorial or inversely dictatorial if it is non-null and satisfies non-imposition. We exhibit a class of domains on which W implies A and another on which A implies W. We also present examples of domains on which one of the statements is true and the other is false.
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页码：273 / 281
页数：8
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