The relationship between board characteristics and performance of bank holding companies: before and during the financial crisis

被引:0
|
作者
O’Sullivan J. [1 ]
Mamun A. [2 ]
Hassan M.K. [3 ]
机构
[1] College of Business and Public Administration, Southern University at New Orleans, 6400 Press Drive, New Orleans, 70126, LA
[2] Edwards School of Business, 78 PotashCorp Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 25 Campus Drive, Saskatoon, S7N 5A7, SK
[3] Department of Economics and Finance, University of New Orleans, 2000 Lakeshore Drive, New Orleans, 70148, LA
关键词
Bank performance; Board characteristics; Financial crisis;
D O I
10.1007/s12197-014-9312-4
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We find that board size, CEO tenure and board tenure enhance bank performance. However, we find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences bank performance. More importantly, we show that the effect of board characteristics during the crisis is quite different. During the crisis, board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and the non-performing asset ratio, which supports Jensen’s (1993) argument that large boards are less likely to function effectively. Further, we report that the non-performing asset ratio decreases with board independence during the crisis. © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media New York.
引用
收藏
页码:438 / 471
页数:33
相关论文
共 50 条