Decoupling Economic Rights from Voting Rights: A Threat to the Traditional Corporate Governance Paradigm

被引:0
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作者
Klaas Vanneste
机构
[1] Bar of Kortrijk,DLPA
[2] University of Leuven,Faculty of Law
关键词
shareholder primacy; new vote buying; empty creditor; new disclosure regime for hidden owners; decoupling;
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学科分类号
摘要
The traditional legal and economic theory of the company is based on the foundational understanding that equity ownership is a bundle of ‘cash flow rights’ and ‘voting rights’. However, this assumption is no longer adequate in today’s economic and financial reality.
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页码:59 / 81
页数:22
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