Are Moral Intuitions Heritable?

被引:0
|
作者
Kevin Smith
Peter K. Hatemi
机构
[1] University of Nebraska,
[2] Pennsylvania State University,undefined
来源
Human Nature | 2020年 / 31卷
关键词
Dual process theory; Genetics; Moral foundations theory; Moral intuitions;
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摘要
Two prominent theoretical frameworks in moral psychology, Moral Foundations and Dual Process Theory, share a broad foundational assumption that individual differences in human morality are dispositional and in part due to genetic variation. The only published direct test of heritability, however, found little evidence of genetic influences on moral judgments using instrumentation approaches associated with Moral Foundations Theory. This raised questions about one of the core assumptions underpinning intuitionist theories of moral psychology. Here we examine the heritability of moral psychology using the moral dilemmas approach commonly used in Dual Process Theory research. Using such measures, we find consistent and significant evidence of heritability. These findings have important implications not only for understanding which measures do, or do not, tap into the genetically influenced aspects of moral decision-making, but in better establishing the utility and validity of different intuitionist theoretical frameworks and the source of why people differ in those frameworks.
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页码:406 / 420
页数:14
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