Justification and epistemic agency

被引：0
|
作者：
Phyllis Pearson
机构：
[1] The University of British Columbia,Department of Philosophy
来源：
Synthese | / 201卷
关键词：
Epistemic justification; Epistemic agency; Internalism; The new evil demon problem; Epistemic normativity;
D O I：
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摘要：
This paper presents a novel account of what motivates internalism about justification in light of recent attempts to undermine the intuitions long thought to favour it (Srinivasan in Philos Rev 129:395–431, 2020). On the account I propose, internalist intuitions are sensitive to epistemic agency. Internalist intuitions track a desire to acknowledge the epistemic agency one has in virtue of being in a position to meet the standards one is accountable to.
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