On the limits of democracy

被引：0
|
作者：
Hans Gersbach
机构：
[1] CER-ETH-Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich and CEPR,
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2011年 / 37卷
关键词：
Majority Rule; Agenda Setter; Constitutional Rule; Public Project; Impossibility Theorem;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
In this article, we extend the analysis of Gersbach (2009) and explore the limits of democratic constitutions to achieve first-best outcomes. We establish the most general possibility result and we illustrate the efficiency gains of flexible majority rules by examples. We show that no first-best constitution exists if there is uncertainty regarding the size of losses and benefits from public projects.
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页码：201 / 217
页数：16
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