Bidding Models and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: A Survey

被引:0
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作者
V. L. Kreps
机构
[1] St. Petersburg Branch,National Research University Higher School of Economics
[2] Russian Academy of Sciences,St. Petersburg Institute of Economics and Mathematics
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关键词
bidding; repeated games; asymmetric information; optimal strategies; random walk; asymptotic behavior;
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摘要
Using a simplified multistage bidding model with asymmetrically informed agents, De Meyer and Saley [17] demonstrated an idea of endogenous origin of the Brownian component in the evolution of prices on stock markets: random price fluctuations may be caused by strategic randomization of “insiders.” The model is reduced to a repeated game with incomplete information. This paper presents a survey of numerous researches inspired by the pioneering publication of De Meyer and Saley.
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页码:362 / 379
页数:17
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