Consistency defaults

被引:0
|
作者
Liberatore P. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Computer and Systems Science, University of Rome La Sapienza, Rome 00198
关键词
Artificial intelligence; Default logic; Knowledge representation; Nonmonotonic reasoning;
D O I
10.1007/s11225-007-9047-8
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
A consistency default is a propositional inference rule that asserts the consistency of a formula in its consequence. Consistency defaults allow for a straightforward encoding of domains in which it is explicitely known when something is possible. The logic of consistency defaults can be seen as a variant of cumulative default logic or as a generalization of justified default logic; it is also able to simulate Reiter default logic in the seminormal case. A semantical characterization of consistency defaults in terms of processes and in terms of a fixpoint equation is given, as well as a normal form. © 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
引用
收藏
页码:89 / 110
页数:21
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