Lessons from philosophy? Interdisciplinary justice research and two classes of justice judgments

More and more scholars of social justice have been calling for a closer collaboration between empirical and normative disciplines. Psychological and sociological research, as well as philosophical theories can, so they claim, learn from one another and work should be based on results obtained in the other fields of research. Some political philosophers do not share this view. They argue that, since most empirical research does not capture people's moral views on justice, its results cannot be of any value to their theories. Based on this critique I suggest in the first part of this paper that empirical research should distinguish between two classes of justice judgments: First, "justice judgments" in a narrow sense, which are made under conditions of impartiality and grounded in moral principles, and second, "justice attitudes," which differ from other types of social attitudes only in their attitude objects. In the second part I present a quasi-experimental study that aimed at testing the two different classes of justice judgments empirically. The results show that justice judgments in the narrow sense can be obtained even under conditions in which complex experimental manipulations cannot be employed. In the third part of this paper I hypothesize that justice judgments which are based on the two formal criteria provided by political philosophy (impartiality and reference to moral principles) may serve as important intervening variables when trying to explain the impact of justice beliefs on different patterns of human behavior. © 2002 Plenum Publishing Corporation.