Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized

被引：0
|
作者：
John Duggan
Thomas Schwartz
机构：
[1] Department of Political Science and Department of Economics,
[2] University of Rochester,undefined
[3] Rochester,undefined
[4] NY 14627,undefined
[5] USA (e-mail: dugg@troi.cc.rochester.edu),undefined
[6] Department of Political Science,undefined
[7] UCLA,undefined
[8] Los Angeles,undefined
[9] CA 90024,undefined
[10] USA,undefined
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2000年 / 17卷
关键词：
Straightforward Generalization; Shared Belief; Probabilistic Belief; Strategic Manipulability;
D O I：
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学科分类号：
摘要：
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem on the manipulability of social-choice rules assumes resoluteness: there are no ties, no multi-member choice sets. Generalizations based on a familiar lottery idea allow ties but assume perfectly shared probabilistic beliefs about their resolution. We prove a more straightforward generalization that assumes almost no limit on ties or beliefs about them.
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页码：85 / 93
页数：8
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