Managerial delegation and partial privatization in general equilibrium with sector-specific unemployment

被引：0
|
作者：
Wang L.F.S. [1 ]
Wang Y.-C. [2 ]
Zhao L. [3 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Applied Economics, National University of Kaohsiung, Nan-Tzu District 811, Kaohsiung, No. 700, Kaohsiung University Road
[2] Department of Finance and Banking, Kun Shan University
[3] Technology Import and Export and International Tendering Center, China HuanQiu Contracting and Engineering Corporation
来源：
International Review of Economics | 2009年 / 56卷 / 4期
关键词：
General equilibrium; Managerial delegation; Unemployment;
D O I：
10.1007/s12232-009-0066-9
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper explores the effects of managerial delegation in a general-equilibrium, oligopolistic competition model with sector-specific unemployment. It specifically examines the effects of managerial delegation on outputs, factor returns and the urban unemployment ratio. It is found that if the managerial firm is less profit-oriented, managerial delegation can lead to an increase in the urban output, a decrease in the rural output, an increase in the capital rental and a decrease in the rural wage. In particular, it worsens the urban unemployment ratio. © 2009 Springer-Verlag.
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页码：393 / 399
页数：6
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