Why property dualists must reject substance physicalism

被引：0

作者：

Susan Schneider

机构：

[1] University of Pennsylvania,Department of Philosophy

来源：

Philosophical Studies | 2012年 / 157卷

关键词：

Property dualism; David Chalmers; Jaegwon Kim; Qualia; Substance dualism; Substance; Mind; Non-reductive physicalism; Consciousness; Bundle theory; Substratum theory; Physicalism; Materialism;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

I argue that property dualists cannot hold that minds are physical substances. The focus of my discussion is a property dualism that takes qualia to be sui generis features of reality.

引用

页码：61 / 76

页数：15

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