The bargaining set of a large game

We study the equivalence between the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the core in the general context of TU games with a measurable space of players. In the first part of the paper, we study the problem without imposing any restriction on the class of games we consider. In the second part, we first introduce a new class of exact games, which we call thin games. For these games, we show not only that the Mas-Colell bargaining set is equal to the core, but also that it is the unique stable set in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern. We then study the relation between thin games, exact non-atomic market games and non-atomic convex games. Finally, by further developing “thinness” related ideas, we prove new equivalence results for a class of non-exact market games as well as a class of non-exact, non-market games.