Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game

被引:0
|
作者
Amy Farmer
Paul Pecorino
机构
[1] University of Tennessee,Department of Economics
[2] University of Alabama,Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
来源
Public Choice | 1999年 / 100卷
关键词
Public Finance; Natural Interaction; Interesting Type; Civil Litigation; Civil Trial;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
Legal expenditures at a civil trial constitute an interesting type of rent-seeking contest. In civil litigation there is a natural interaction between the objective merits of the case and the outcome of the contest. Institutions such as fee shifting do not generally have a counterpart in other rent-seeking contests. The endogenous decision to participate in the rent-seeking contest corresponds to the decision by the plaintiff to bring a case, and the decision by the defendant to defend it. The desirability of fee shifting is very sensitive to the value of the parameter which describes the legal technology.
引用
收藏
页码:271 / 288
页数:17
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game
    Farmer, A
    Pecorino, P
    [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1999, 100 (3-4) : 271 - 288
  • [2] Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game
    Clark, DJ
    [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1997, 93 (1-2) : 119 - 130
  • [3] Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game
    Derek J. Clark
    [J]. Public Choice, 1997, 93 : 119 - 130
  • [4] Game Analysis on rent-seeking behavior of managers
    Pei Hongling
    Tai Xiaohong
    [J]. PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH (2012) INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FINANCIAL RISK AND CORPORATE FINANCE MANAGEMENT, VOLS I AND II, 2012, : 240 - +
  • [5] Rent and Rent-seeking in Iran
    Akbarabadi, Esmaiel Gorgin
    Tavana, Ali Najafi
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND LAW, 2016, 9 (06) : 36 - 41
  • [6] The game analysis of rent-seeking behavior in the public project
    Jiang, Kai
    Peng, Ying
    Chen, Yushui
    [J]. ADVANCES IN STRUCTURAL ENGINEERING, PTS 1-3, 2011, 94-96 : 2233 - 2237
  • [7] Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement
    L. Schoonbeek
    P. Kooreman
    [J]. Public Choice, 1997, 93 : 477 - 486
  • [8] Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement
    Schoonbeek, L
    Kooreman, P
    [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1997, 93 (3-4) : 477 - 486
  • [9] The dark side of rent-seeking: The impact of rent-seeking on earnings management
    Liu, Baohua
    Lin, Yan
    Chan, Kam C.
    Fung, Hung-Gay
    [J]. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, 2018, 91 : 94 - 107
  • [10] COOPERATIVE RENT-SEEKING
    LINSTER, BG
    [J]. PUBLIC CHOICE, 1994, 81 (1-2) : 23 - 34