Privatization and efficiency wages

被引:0
|
作者
Laszlo Goerke
机构
[1] University of Konstanz,Department of Economics
来源
Journal of Economics | 1998年 / 67卷
关键词
efficiency wages; privatization; wage bargaining; L33; J41; J45; J51;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.
引用
收藏
页码:243 / 264
页数:21
相关论文
共 50 条