Paternalism and Liberty/Autonomy as Dialectically Related Concepts

Following a seminal definition by Gerald Dworkin, paternalism comprises interventions which interfere with the liberty or autonomy of a person, lack the concerned person’s consent and are conducted with benevolent intention. In a paper titled “The Concept of Paternalism” Dominik Düber advises abstaining from applying the notions of liberty and autonomy in a conceptual analysis of paternalism in order to avoid conceptual confusion and moral preconception regarding paternalism. In the present paper, I will argue to the contrary that both the concept and justification of paternalism depend dialectically on the notions of liberty and autonomy, respectively. The concept of paternalism alters its structure and meaning according to these notions. Likewise, the legal and ethical evaluation of particular instances of paternalism depend on the related concepts of liberty and autonomy.