On consistent solutions for strategic games

被引：0
|
作者：
Fioravante Patrone
Graziano Pieri
Stef Tijs
Anna Torre
机构：
[1] Department of Mathematics,
[2] University of Genoa,undefined
[3] Via Dodecaneso 35,undefined
[4] I-16146 Genoa,undefined
[5] Italy (e-mail: patrone@dima.unige.it),undefined
[6] Institute of Scientific and Technical Disciplines,undefined
[7] Faculty of Architecture,undefined
[8] University of Genoa,undefined
[9] Stradone S. Agostino 37,undefined
[10] I-16123 Genoa,undefined
[11] Italy (e-mail: pieri@dima.unige.it),undefined
[12] Department of Econometrics,undefined
[13] University of Tilburg,undefined
[14] Postbus 90153,undefined
[15] 5000 LE Tilburg,undefined
[16] The Netherlands (e-mail: S.H.Tijs@kub.nl),undefined
[17] Department of Mathematics,undefined
[18] University of Pavia,undefined
[19] Via Abbiategrasso 209,undefined
[20] I-27100 Pavia,undefined
[21] Italy (e-mail: anna@dragon.ian.pv.cnr.it),undefined
来源：
International Journal of Game Theory | 1998年 / 27卷
关键词：
Key words: Consistency; axiomatization; strategic games; choice rules;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Nash equilibria for strategic games were characterized by Peleg and Tijs (1996) as those solutions satisfying the properties of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality.
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页码：191 / 200
页数：9
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