Two-level game operational code: analysis of foreign and domestic policy preferences of national leaders

While previous literature on two-level game theory of decision making focuses on individual issues and cases, we argue that leaders possess a stable hierarchy of preferences that includes both domestic and foreign policy preferences arranged so that they mutually reinforce one another. These preferences remain stable over time, even in face of dramatically changed circumstances in the form of emerging foreign or domestic threats to power. Whereas some leaders are mainly preoccupied with the preservation of the domestic social order, others recognize that dealing with emerging foreign threats may demand extensive domestic reforms that will upset the internal social order. To validate the theory, we conduct text analysis of speeches made by Herbert Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in order to reveal the stable hierarchy of domestic and foreign policy preferences informing their political decisions. Our analysis provides strong support for our hypotheses, though the rhetoric of political leaders is also affected by network effects and the growing or waning salience of political issues at the time the speech was given.