Central government subsidies to local public goods

被引:1
|
作者
Nobuo Akai
Toshihiro Ihori
机构
[1] Institute of Economic Research,
[2] Kobe University of Commerce,undefined
[3] 8-2-1 Gakuen-Nishimachi,undefined
[4] Nishiku,undefined
[5] Kobe,undefined
[6] 651-2197,undefined
[7] Japan,undefined
[8] (e-mail: akai@kobeuc.ac.jp) ,undefined
[9] Department of Economics,undefined
[10] University of Tokyo ,undefined
[11] Economic and Social Research Institute,undefined
[12] Cabinet Office,undefined
[13] Government of Japan ,undefined
关键词
Key words: Local public good, central public good, subsidy, Lindahl price criterion; JEL Classification: H23, H41, H71;
D O I
10.1007/s101010200048
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a second-best framework and explore how the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the relative evaluation of the two types of public goods.
引用
收藏
页码:227 / 239
页数:12
相关论文
共 50 条