The value of a player in n-person games

被引:0
|
作者
Kjell Hausken
Matthias Mohr
机构
[1]  School of Economics,
[2] Culture and Social Sciences,undefined
[3] University of Stavanger,undefined
[4] P.O. Box 2557 Ullandhaug,undefined
[5] N-4091 Stavanger,undefined
[6] Norway (e-mail: Kjell.Hausken@oks.his.no),undefined
[7]  Deutsche Bundesbank,undefined
[8] Economics Department,undefined
[9] Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14-16,undefined
[10] P.O. Box 100602,undefined
[11] D-60006 Frankfurt am Main,undefined
[12] Germany (e-mail: Matthias.Mohr@bundesbank.de),undefined
来源
Social Choice and Welfare | 2001年 / 18卷
关键词
European Council; Vote Procedure; Column Player; Respective Player;
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学科分类号
摘要
. The article decomposes the Shapley value into a value matrix which gives the value of every player to every other player in n-person games. Element Φij(v) in the value matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row player i is beneficial, has no impact, or is not beneficial for column player j. The elements in each row and in each column of the value matrix sum up to the Shapley value of the respective player. The value matrix is illustrated by the voting procedure in the European Council of Ministers 1981–1995.
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页码:465 / 483
页数:18
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