Imperfect recall and the relationships between solution concepts in extensive games

被引:0
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作者
Jeffrey Jude Kline
机构
[1] Bond University,Department of Economics, School of Business
来源
Economic Theory | 2005年 / 25卷
关键词
Memory; Imperfect recall; Extensive games; Solutions.;
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摘要
In a game of imperfect recall, a sequential equilibrium may not be a Nash equilibrium, and a perfect equilibrium may not be a sequential equilibrium. Sufficiency conditions weaker than perfect recall are given to ensure the standard relationships hold between perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
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页码:703 / 710
页数:7
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