Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space

被引:0
|
作者
Bernis G. [1 ]
Giraud G. [2 ]
机构
[1] Calyon, Capital Markets - GCE, 92920 Paris-La Défense
[2] CERMSEM, Université Paris 1, 75647 Paris cedex 13
关键词
Banach lattice; Constrained Walras equilibria; Mechanism design; Non-ordered preferences;
D O I
10.1007/s10058-005-0130-1
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper deals with the problem of implementing the Walras correspondence via Nash equilibria, in exchange economies with infinitely many commodities and finitely many households with possibly non-ordered preferences. We explicitly construct a feasible mechanism enjoying some features, which have natural economic meanings. Under a fairly weak boundary condition, this game fully implements the Walras equilibria. If this condition is not fulfilled, our mechanism nevertheless implements the constrained Walras equilibria. © Springer-Verlag 2005.
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页码:271 / 287
页数:16
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