Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures

被引：0
|
作者：
Fuhito Kojima
机构：
[1] Harvard University,Department of Economics
来源：
Social Choice and Welfare | 2008年 / 31卷
关键词：
Nash Equilibrium; School District; Aggregate Demand; Dominant Strategy; Stable Match;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The Boston mechanism is a centralized student assignment mechanism used in many school districts in the US. We investigate strategic behavior of students under the Boston mechanism when schools may have complex priority structures. We show that a stable matching is supported as an outcome of a Nash equilibrium under a general environment. We further show that any outcome of a Nash equilibrium is a stable matching when the school priorities are substitutable.
引用
收藏
页码：357 / 365
页数：8
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism with general priority structures
    Kojima, Fuhito
    [J]. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 2008, 31 (03) : 357 - 365
  • [2] Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
    Ergin, H
    Sönmez, T
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2006, 90 (1-2) : 215 - 237
  • [3] School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism
    Miralles, Antonio
    [J]. AUCTIONS, MARKET MECHANISMS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS, 2009, 14 : 58 - 60
  • [4] Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
    David Cantala
    Juan Sebastián Pereyra
    [J]. Review of Economic Design, 2017, 21 : 49 - 63
  • [5] Priority-driven behaviors under the Boston mechanism
    Cantala, David
    Pereyra, Juan Sebastian
    [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN, 2017, 21 (01) : 49 - 63
  • [6] Priorities in school choice: The case of the Boston mechanism in Barcelona
    Calsamiglia, Caterina
    Guell, Maia
    [J]. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, 2018, 163 : 20 - 36
  • [7] The "Boston" school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
    Kojima, Fuhito
    Uenver, M. Utku
    [J]. ECONOMIC THEORY, 2014, 55 (03) : 515 - 544
  • [8] The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
    Fuhito Kojima
    M. Utku Ünver
    [J]. Economic Theory, 2014, 55 : 515 - 544
  • [9] Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered
    Abdulkadiroglu, Atila
    Che, Yeon-Koo
    Yasuda, Yosuke
    [J]. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2011, 101 (01): : 399 - 410
  • [10] Boston School Choice Mechanism for User Association in Heterogeneous Networks
    Ismael, Fouad
    Abd El-Malek, Ahmed H.
    Elsabrouty, Maha
    [J]. 2018 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WIRELESS AND MOBILE COMPUTING, NETWORKING AND COMMUNICATIONS (WIMOB 2018), 2018,
12345