Displacing your principal. Two historical case studies of some interest for the constitutional future of Europe

被引：0

作者：

Josselin J.-M. ^{[1
]}

Marciano A. ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Université de Rennes (France), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CREREG), Faculté des Sciences Économiques, 35065 Rennes Cédex

[2] Université de Corse-Pascal Paoli (France), Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (GREQAM), Faculté de Droit et d'Économie, 20250 Corte

来源：

European Journal of Law and Economics | 2000年 / 10卷 / 3期

关键词：

Agency theory; European integration; Strategic behaviours;

D O I：

10.1023/A:1026543414937

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

The framework of public decisions, and particularly the provision of law, is seen here as an agency contract. What distinguishes this contract is the nature of the right delegated to the agent: The capacity to make law gives the opportunity to take advantage of the incompleteness of the constitutional contract. The agency relationship may be loosened or even reversed. This article tries to draw some lessons from the English and American history in that matter and applies them to the making of the future European State. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

引用

页码：217 / 233

页数：16