The Economics of Business Crime: Theory and Public Policy Implications

被引:0
|
作者
Nuno Garoupa
机构
[1] Associate Professor,
[2] Faculty of Economics of the New University of Lisbon (Universidade Nova de Lisboa),undefined
关键词
Law enforcement; corporation; business; principal-agent model;
D O I
10.1057/palgrave.sj.8340189
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The economics of crime has traditionally been concerned with individual deterrence, from a cost-benefit analysis viewpoint. Generally speaking, firms or corporations rather than individual criminals commit business crimes. Thus, agency theory (that is, the principal-agent framework) seems very appealing, and particularly suitable for generating useful insights into business crime. In this paper we give a brief introduction to the economic theory of business crime and enforcement. We discuss corporate criminal liability, implications for business security, and the political economy of business crime.
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页码:29 / 41
页数:12
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