Infinitism, finitude and normativity

被引：0
|
作者：
John Turri
机构：
[1] University of Waterloo,Philosophy Department
来源：
Philosophical Studies | 2013年 / 163卷
关键词：
Infinitism; Finite-mind objection; Epistemic normativity; Epistemic justification; Peter Klein; Adam Podlaskowski; Joshua Smith;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
I evaluate two new objections to an infinitist account of epistemic justification, and conclude that they fail to raise any new problems for infinitism. The new objections are a refined version of the finite-mind objection, which says infinitism demands more than finite minds can muster, and the normativity objection, which says infinitism entails that we are epistemically blameless in holding all our beliefs. I show how resources deployed in response to the most popular objection to infinitism, the original finite-mind objection, can be redeployed to address the two new objections.
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页码：791 / 795
页数：4
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