Do Voters Reward Politicians for Trade Liberalization? Evidence from South Korea

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作者
Sung Eun Kim
Sujin Cha
机构
[1] Korea University,
关键词
Trade preferences; Preferential trade agreement; Free trade agreement; Voting behavior; Electoral politics;
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摘要
Do voters reward politicians for trade liberalization? We examine this question by analyzing voter responses in South Korea to the US-Korea Trade Agreement. Exploiting a change in party positions on the FTA over time, we examine the effects of different party positions on outcomes in the legislative and presidential elections. We find that voters who expect direct gains (losses) specifically from the treaty increase (decrease) support for the pro-trade party. However, voters in export-oriented industries do not reward politicians for a free trade agreement that does not directly affect their well-being. Our analysis of seven waves of individual-level panel survey data also demonstrates that a short-term change in a candidate’s position on the FTA influences voter decisions in the upcoming presidential election. The findings suggest that voter preferences with regard to trade can materialize into voting behavior when voters have a clear ex ante expectation of specific gains or losses from the trade policy.
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页码:751 / 780
页数:29
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