Fault analysis of the PRINCE family of lightweight ciphers

被引:0
|
作者
Anup Kumar Kundu
Banashri Aikata
Dhiman Karmakar
机构
[1] Indian Statistical Institute,Department of Cryptology and Security
[2] Graz University of Technology,The Institute of Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK)
[3] Indian Institute of Technology Bhilai,de.ci.phe.red Lab, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
来源
关键词
PRINCE; PRINCEv2; Integral property; Diffusion; DFA; Fault attack;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In ASHES 2020 (Aikata et al., in: Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on attacks and solutions in hardware security workshop, ASHES@CCS 2020, virtual event, November 13, 2020, USA, ACM, 2020), new integral and slow diffusion trails were reported on PRINCE and were used to mount fault attacks with practical complexities. We extend this work by performing new differential fault attacks based on the popular random bit-flip fault model, which has not been looked at in isolation for PRINCE until today. Additionally, we look at the construction of PRINCEv2 reported in SAC 2020 in the light of the attacks developed in this work and find that PRINCEv2 is equally vulnerable to them. We also highlight an interesting aspect of fault-reflection, which amplifies the scope of fault injection on PRINCE-like ciphers. The bit-flip model can recover the key uniquely at the expense of 7 random bit-faults injected at the input of Round-10 with a time complexity of 221\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2^{21}$$\end{document}. The integral fault attack has a time complexity of 236\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2^{36}$$\end{document} and 220\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2^{20}$$\end{document} with 15 nibble faults in rounds 8.5 and 9.5, while the slow diffusion differential fault attack works with four bit-faults in the 10th round with a complexity of 222\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$2^{22}$$\end{document}. The array of fault attacks presented in this work constitute a comprehensive account of fault attack vulnerability of both PRINCE and PRINCEv2. Moreover, the 3D visualization model of PRINCE state introduced can be used to extend or improve existing attacks on PRINCE.
引用
收藏
页码:475 / 494
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Fault analysis of the PRINCE family of lightweight ciphers
    Kundu, Anup Kumar
    Aikata
    Karmakar, Banashri
    Saha, Dhiman
    JOURNAL OF CRYPTOGRAPHIC ENGINEERING, 2022, 12 (04) : 475 - 494
  • [2] Fault-cube attack on SIMON family of lightweight block ciphers
    Ma Y.-F.
    Wang T.
    Chen H.
    Zhang F.
    Lou X.-X.
    Xu L.-M.
    Yang W.-B.
    Wang, Tao (T_Wang_mail@163.com), 1770, Zhejiang University (51): : 1770 - 1779
  • [3] The Simeck Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers
    Yang, Gangqiang
    Zhu, Bo
    Suder, Valentin
    Aagaard, Mark D.
    Gong, Guang
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE AND EMBEDDED SYSTEMS - CHES 2015, 2015, 9293 : 307 - 329
  • [4] Differential Fault Analysis on Tiaoxin and AEGIS Family of Ciphers
    Dey, Prakash
    Rohit, Raghvendra Singh
    Sarkar, Santanu
    Adhikari, Avishek
    SECURITY IN COMPUTING AND COMMUNICATIONS, SSCC 2016, 2016, 625 : 74 - 86
  • [5] A Framework for the Analysis and Evaluation of Algebraic Fault Attacks on Lightweight Block Ciphers
    Zhang, Fan
    Guo, Shize
    Zhao, Xinjie
    Wang, Tao
    Yang, Jian
    Standaert, Francois-Xavier
    Gu, Dawu
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, 2016, 11 (05) : 1039 - 1054
  • [6] Free Fault Leakages for Deep Exploitation: Algebraic Persistent Fault Analysis on Lightweight Block Ciphers
    Zhang F.
    Feng T.
    Li Z.
    Ren K.
    Zhao X.
    IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, 2022, 2022 (02): : 289 - 311
  • [7] KLEIN: A New Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers
    Gong, Zheng
    Nikova, Svetla
    Law, Yee Wei
    RFID SECURITY AND PRIVACY, 2012, 7055 : 1 - +
  • [8] KLEIN: A New Family of Lightweight Block Ciphers
    Gong, Zheng
    Nikova, Svetla
    Law, Yee Wei
    RFID: SECURITY AND PRIVACY: 7TH INTERNATIONALWORKSHOP, RFIDSEC 2011, 2012, 7055 : 1 - 18
  • [9] A Fault Attack on the Family of Enocoro Stream Ciphers
    Danner, Julian
    Kreuzer, Martin
    CRYPTOGRAPHY, 2021, 5 (04)
  • [10] Fault analysis of stream ciphers
    Hoch, JJ
    Shamir, A
    CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE AND EMBEDDED SYSTEMS - CHES 2004, PROCEEDINGS, 2004, 3156 : 240 - 253