The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

被引:0
|
作者
Lars P. Feld
机构
[1] Philipps-University of Marburg,
[2] Public Finance Group,undefined
来源
Public Choice | 2005年 / 122卷
关键词
Political Economy; Public Finance; Political Decision; Strong Control; Direct Democracy;
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摘要
Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.
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页码:417 / 448
页数:31
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