Discretionary disclosure and the market reaction to restatements

被引:23
|
作者
Gordon E.A. [1 ]
Henry E. [2 ]
Peytcheva M. [3 ]
Sun L. [4 ]
机构
[1] Fox School of Business and Management, Temple University, 453 Alter Hall, 1801 Liacouras Walk, Philadelphia, PA
[2] Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University, 5th Floor, 441 E. Fordham Road, Bronx, NY
[3] College of Business and Economics, Lehigh University, 621 Taylor Street, Bethlehem, PA
[4] Department of Accounting, College of Business University of North Texas, 1155 Union Circle #305219, Denton, TX
关键词
Discretionary disclosure; Fraud; Restatement; Tone;
D O I
10.1007/s11156-012-0301-4
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper presents evidence that management's disclosure choices related to a restatement are associated with the market reaction at the time the restatement is announced. The two aspects of pre-restatement disclosure choice we examine are the amount of disclosure, hypothesized to reduce information asymmetries, and the tone of disclosure, hypothesized to exacerbate the effect of subsequently-disconfirmed market expectations. Our results provide support for both hypothesized effects, controlling for characteristics that previous research has shown to affect market reaction to restatements-financial attributes of restatements, and concurrent disclosure choices such as prominence of the announcement. We also find that concurrent and prior disclosure characteristics have equivalent and complementary power in explaining market reaction to restatements, while interactive effects indicate that pre-restatement disclosure choices reduce the marginal market impact of concurrent disclosure characteristics. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
引用
收藏
页码:75 / 110
页数:35
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