On the structure of the set of Nash equilibriaof weakly nondegenerate bimatrix games

被引:0
|
作者
Hans Keiding
机构
来源
关键词
Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Convex Polytope; Basic Equilibrium;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
In two-person games where each player has a finite number of pure strategies, the set of Nash equilibria is a finite set when a certain nondegeneracy condition is satisfied. Recent investigations have shown that for n × n games, the cardinality of this finite set is bounded from above by a functionφ(n) with 2n − 1 ≤ φ(n) ≤ (27/4)n/2− 1, where n is the maximal number of pure strategies of any player. In the present paper, we generalize this result to a class of games which may not satisfy the nondegeneracy condition. The set of Nash equilibria may be infinite; it is shown that it consists of no more than φ(n) arc-connected components.
引用
收藏
页码:231 / 238
页数:7
相关论文
共 50 条