Nash Equilibrium;
Mixed Strategy;
Pure Strategy;
Convex Polytope;
Basic Equilibrium;
D O I:
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摘要:
In two-person games where each player has a finite number of pure strategies, the set of Nash equilibria is a finite set when a certain nondegeneracy condition is satisfied. Recent investigations have shown that for n × n games, the cardinality of this finite set is bounded from above by a functionφ(n) with 2n − 1 ≤ φ(n) ≤ (27/4)n/2− 1, where n is the maximal number of pure strategies of any player. In the present paper, we generalize this result to a class of games which may not satisfy the nondegeneracy condition. The set of Nash equilibria may be infinite; it is shown that it consists of no more than φ(n) arc-connected components.