The geometry of inductive reasoning in games

被引:0
|
作者
Diana Richards
机构
[1] Department of Political Science,
[2] University of Minnesota,undefined
[3] Minneapolis,undefined
[4] MN 55455,undefined
[5] USA,undefined
来源
Economic Theory | 1997年 / 10卷
关键词
JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D83.;
D O I
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中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
 This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most well-known inductive learning rule, Brown’s fictitious play, is known to converge for \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}\end{document} games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results.
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页码:185 / 193
页数:8
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