An agent-based model of organizational ambidexterity decisions and strategies in new product development

Organizational ambidexterity, defined as the pursuit of both exploitation and exploration, has become an important topic in the study of organizations, especially in innovation management theory. Previous literature has not focused on the strategic (game-theoretic) aspects of organizational ambidexterity or on its decision-making aspects. Little is known about how or even whether the decision to adopt ambidexterity is competitively advantageous in the presence of diverse strategies that competitors may adopt. This facet of the subject is inherently game-theoretic; the value of a decision by one firm depends in part on decisions made by other firms. This paper initiates systematic investigation of these strategic aspects, including the overall performance of available strategies. Specifically, this study examines questions of ambidexterity-related strategy performance in the context of new product development. The main contributions are (1) to introduce and make available to the research community an agent-based model and decision support system that captures many of the key aspects and tradeoffs, which have been identified in the literature, of the exploration–exploitation dilemma faced by firms in the new product development process, with a focus on organizations’ product investment decisions and (2) to report on results obtained from the model, calibrated with available data from the literature, augmented by new data collected from interviews with practitioners.