Choosing free trade without amending the U.S. Constitution

被引:0
|
作者
Willem Thorbecke
机构
[1] George Mason University,Department of Economics
来源
Public Choice | 1997年 / 90卷
关键词
Special Interest; International Trade; Public Finance; Government Official; Free Trade;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
This paper documents the functioning of the market in trade protection. It uses a narrative approach to demonstrate that politicians respond to the demands of special interests by forcing open foreign markets and by closing domestic markets. In the process government officials violate property rights, disregard economic logic, damage the world trading system, multiply rent-seeking costs, and destroy wealth. Such outcomes imply that there is a constitutional failure, and that the rules and institutions governing international trade need to be reformed. This paper discusses several such changes and considers how consumers could be mobilized to support them.
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页码:185 / 200
页数:15
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