In defense of a non-causal account of reasons explanations

被引：0
|
作者：
Ginet C. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Sage School of Philosophy, Cornell University, Ithaca
来源：
The Journal of Ethics | 2008年 / 12卷 / 3-4期
关键词：
Explanation of action; Intentional action; Non-causal explanation; Reasons for acting;
D O I：
10.1007/s10892-008-9033-z
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will. © 2008 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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页码：229 / 237
页数：8
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