Price collusion with free entry: the parasitic competition

被引:0
|
作者
Aldo Montesano
机构
[1] Bocconi University,Department of Economics
关键词
Price collusion; Free entry; Corporatist system; D40; D61; L11; L43; P19;
D O I
10.1007/s12232-011-0141-x
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The market equilibrium that is generated in the presence of both price collusion and free entry is analyzed taking under consideration the case of a homogeneous product and the case of differentiated products. The outcomes of this market regime are compared with those of other regimes, including competition (or monopolistic competition), monopoly, fixed price with collusive entry limitation. Some welfare implications of the market regime of price collusion with free entry are examined, with respect to the maximum social welfare allocation and the allocations of other market regimes, so to highlight the inefficiency of price collusion with free entry. The number of producers results to be the maximum number of firms that can produce without incurring into losses. Therefore, social distress is caused by a displacement from the price collusion equilibrium with free entry. Its defence can thus be considered in reference to the desirability of social goals that are in contradiction with economic efficiency.
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页码:41 / 65
页数:24
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