Bilateral Oligopoly, Private Information, and Pollution Permit Markets

被引：0
|
作者：
David A. Malueg
Andrew J. Yates
机构：
[1] University of California,Department of Economics
[2] University of Richmond,Department of Economics, E. Claiborne Robins School of Business
来源：
Environmental and Resource Economics | 2009年 / 43卷
关键词：
Bilateral oligopoly; Pollution permits; Private information; D43; D82; L13; Q5;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker determines the market-clearing price. Net supplies depend on abatement cost functions, which in turn depend on private information parameters. We calculate the increase in aggregate abatement costs due to strategic behavior and private information and show that private information attenuates the effects of strategic behavior.
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页码：553 / 572
页数：19
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