The role of investors' objective financial knowledge on the assessment of risk disclosures in mutual fund advertisements

This study examined the role of investors' objective financial knowledge in processing risk disclosures in mutual-fund advertisements. Investors were exposed to a mutual fund advertisement containing either a disclaimer mandated by regulatory bodies or a strongly worded warning label. Overall, the results showed that mandated disclaimers were ineffective in reducing investors' return expectations and attitudes toward the advertised fund, regardless of the investors' level of financial knowledge. However, strongly worded warning labels effectively impacted the return expectations and attitudes of low-knowledge investors, but not high-knowledge investors. That is, the impact of warning labels was dependent on the level of an investors' financial knowledge; specifically, high-knowledge investors failed to discount past performance as a heuristic cue in their judgments. Importantly, this behavior of high-knowledge investors was not due to a familiarity effect; the risk disclosures were properly encoded and processed by knowledgeable investors. These results suggest that high-knowledge investors either possessed strongly held beliefs (for example, the 'hot hand' effect) that persevered even when exposed to the strongly worded warning, or they were overconfident in their judgments. © 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd.