Positional information and preference aggregation

被引：0

作者：

Robert C. Powers

机构：

[1] University of Louisville,Department of Mathematics

来源：

Social Choice and Welfare | 2005年 / 24卷

关键词：

Social Welfare; Economic Theory; Positional Information; Social Welfare Function; Preference Aggregation;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

A new version of independence (I+) is proposed for social welfare functions based on the following notion of agreement. Two weak orders R and R’ on a finite set Sagree on a pair {x,y}, denoted by

引用

页码：575 / 583

页数：8

共 50 条

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